Trinity Test & Project Alberta Goes To Tinian

7-6-11

Chapter 10

The Trinity Test & Project Alberta Goes to Tinian;

July 16-August 3, 1945

The success of the implosion-type plutonium bomb at Alamagordo was not certain. Its spherical nature bad been problematic. The fusing and detonating mechanisms were much more complex than the uranium gun-type bomb. If the detonators did not perform with absolute simultaneity, the ball of plutonium in its center would not be perfectly crushed to critical mass. Oppenheimer concluded that a test, an experimental detonation of a plutonium pit under controlled circumstances, would be necessary before the effort should be made to fly an active sphere 9,000 miles to a remote Pacific island, insert it into a Fat Man casing, fly it to Japan, drop it from 30,000 feet on the correct target and make it explode at the correct altitude.

Groves and Oppenheimer agreed that if the test was successful, then the assembly team would be flown to Tinian on Tibbets’s Green Hornets. The Fat Man spheres would be flown on his B-29s.

The Trinity Test had also became part and parcel to peace negotiations taking place in Germany. Truman and Stalin would be meeting for the first time. Truman was aware that Stalin had broken the spirit of his commitment to Roosevelt at Yalta regarding the development of a free Europe. Yet, he still needed Stalin to send his armies into Manchuria before the other Allied troops landed in southern Kyushu. It would save untold Allied lives.

If the test worked and he really had an atomic bomb in his pocket, Truman could be firm with Stalin on European issues and end the war before Russian troops could land in Hokkaido, saving Japan from the partition that was developing in Germany. In time, Japan could become an effective free world ally; a buffer zone between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the Pacific. If not, inevitably, there would be a U.S. occupied Honshu and a Russian occupied Hokkaido.

Bottom line: the bomb could prevent the forced invasion of Japan and its partition. The man from Missouri needed an ace in the hole.

Oppenheimer had predicted that the test could take place by early-July, the Fourth of July, actually. With the plutonium production increasing, expending one plutonium pit for an experiment was affordable. Groves immediately went to work identifying and building the test site. He chose an isolated army base some distance from Alamogordo, New Mexico. Security was good. Nothing much lived there except, scrub cactus, rabbits, rattlesnakes and Gila monsters. An Independence Day fireworks display by Groves would have made Truman very happy. Unfortunately, parts problems forced Oppenheimer to postpone the test until July 16^th. Groves was not pleased.

As the president and Secretary of War Stimson had prepared to leave for Potsdam, Germany, and their showdown with Stalin on how to end the war is Asia, Stimson had ordered Groves to report the results of the test to him by courier through his secretary Harrison. Although the twelve-day delay gnawed at Groves’ well endowed stomach, he trusted Oppenheimer to make it happen – successfully – on the 16th. That would be just before the critical meeting between Truman and Stalin. A hurried dud would be bad for moral, not to mention world affairs.

July 16, 1945. Alamogordo Testing Grounds, New Mexico

The plutonium bomb test that took place in the New Mexico desert on July 16, 1945, code-named Trinity, was probably the greatest scientific experiment ever staged. It had been in the planning stages for months. Many of the dignitaries from the Manhattan Project were present to witness the event, some betting for success, some against.

At the scheduled time of 1:00 a.m., Oppenheimer and Groves decided to leave the Trinity Base Camp -- S-10,000 -- so named because it was 10,000 yards south of Ground Zero. (Coster-Mullen, P. 333) They drove some ten miles up to the control dugout, which was 5.7 miles from the tower (Groves, Coster-Mullen, p. 7). General Farrell was stationed there, in charge of the men who were constantly checking and rechecking all the electrical systems that controlled the bomb and the firing devise. Conditions forced another hour’s delay, then another thirty minutes. The test finally set for 5:30 a.m.

The arming party checked and rechecked the numerous electrical circuits and then left the bunker for the base camp. Thirty minutes before the new zero hour, Groves and the five guards who had been stationed at the dugout returned to the base camp. By their own rules, Groves and Farrell could never be together at any time that might cost both of their lives. That left Oppenheimer and Farrell in the dugout.

Everyone at the base camp was ordered to lay face down on the ground with their feet pointing in the direction of the blast. The welder’s glasses that were supposed to have been issued to all personnel from the Base Camp Fubar stockroom did not arrive. Instead, they were told to cover their eyes with their hands, and not turn over to look at the blast until they became aware of the flash. Then they could put on their smoked glasses, turn over, sit up and watch whatever happened. Groves was lying on the ground between Bush and Conant when the bomb went off at 0530 on 16, July 1945. According to Groves:

My first impression was one of tremendous light, and then as I turned, I saw the now familiar fireball. As Bush, Conant and I sat on the ground looking at this phenomenon, the first reactions of the three of us were expressed in a silent exchange of handclasps (Groves, p. ).

Physicist Otto Frisch, the man who had worked with Lisa Meitner to prove that a nuclear chain reaction was possible, said, “Suddenly and without any sound, the hills were bathed in brilliant light, as if somebody had turn the sun on with a switch.” (Quoted in Coster-Mullen.)

The 425 stunned observers stood in awe as the radiant heat from the blast passed them by. This was followed by a rumbling blast that rolled through the valley and hills of the Jornado del Muerto – Spanish for Dead Man’s Route (Coster-Mullen). Following the shock of watching the fantastic display of light was the sobering thought of how the bomb was meant to be used. General Farrell, who had returned from the dugout with Oppenheimer, walked up to Groves and said, “The war is over.”

Groves replied, “Yes. After we drop two bombs on Japan.”

Enrico Fermi had dropped some shreds of paper and collected them after the shock wave passed. From this data he predicted the blast of the explosion at ??? Kilotons.

Groves immediately went to the communications tent and sent a special message to George Harrison, Stimson’s number two in the War Department. He had remained behind to serve as liaison between Alamogordo and Potsdam. As quickly as Harrison received the coded message from Groves, he forwarded it to Secretary Stimson through his aide, Colonel Kyles:

Top Secret

Urgent

War 32887

For Colonel Kyles eyes only

From Harrison for Mr. Stimson

Operated on this morning. Diagnosis not yet complete, but results seem satisfactory and already exceed expectations. Local press release necessary as interest extends great distance. Dr. Groves pleased. He returns tomorrow. I will keep you posted.” (Mee, 1975, p. 84)

A world away that day, President Truman was touring the ruins of Berlin. After returning to what had become known as the Little White House, Stimson handed him the initial message from George Harrison, who was serving as liaison between Alamogordo and Potsdam. This was the news President Truman had been hoping for since before sailing across the Atlantic for the rendezvous with Stalin. Now, he had his trump card. The United States could finish off Japan by itself and, hopefully, prevent postwar problems in Asia.

Groves later wrote:

Drs. Conant and Bush and myself were struck by an even stronger feeling that the faith of those who had been responsible for the initiation and the carrying-on of the Herculean project had been justified. I personally thought of Blondin crossing Niagara Falls on his tightrope, only to me this tightrope had lasted almost three years, and of my repeated, confident-appearing assurances that such a thing was possible and that we could do it (Groves, p. ).

Groves then issued the following press release to answer the growing number of questions that were being raised by residents of New Mexico and El Paso in West Texas about the strange explosion:

The commanding officer of the Alamogordo Army Air Base made the following statement today:

Several inquiries have been received concerning a heavy explosion which occurred on the Alamogordo Air Base reservation this morning.

A remotely located ammunition magazine containing a considerable amount of high explosives and pyrotechnics exploded.

There was no loss of life or injury to anyone, and the property damage outside of the explosives magazine itself was negligible.

Weather conditions affecting the content of gas shells exploded by the blast may make it desirable for the Army to evacuate temporarily a few civilians from their homes.

Alamogordo, N. M., July 16. (Groves, p. )

The world had been forever changed.

Groves immediately flew from New Mexico to D.C. He, Farrell and Mrs. O’Leary began hammering out a final report for the president.

#

Back in San Francisco, shortly after Oppenheimer brought the “light of a thousand suns” to the New Mexico desert, Major Furman and Captain Nolan handed the following dramatic orders to Captain Charles Butler McVay, III, Commanding Officer, USS Indianapolis:

You will sail at high speed to Tinian where your cargo will be taken off by others. You will not be told what the cargo is, but it is to be guarded even after the life of your vessel. If she goes down, save the cargo at all costs, in a lifeboat if necessary. And every day you save on your voyage will cut the length of the war by just that much (RG 77. Box ).

Furman and Nolan then oversaw the loading of a large crate and two much small boxes onto the USS Indianapolis. The 10,000# basic assembly for “Little Boy,” America’s first atomic bomb, was bolted to the ship’s deck. The 300# box holding the active uranium projectile was bolted to the deck of captain's cabin (RG 77, Box 3, file # 5C-3; RG 77, Box 19). He would sleep with it all the way to Tinian. A couple hours later Indianapolis passed under the Golden Gate Bridge on its way to Tinian, full speed ahead, unwittingly sailing into history.

While Groves and Farrell flew back to D.C. to prepare their report for the president, who had already arrived at Potsdam (Hoopes, 1992, p. 211), the “Fat Man” assembly team at Los Alamos was ordered to packed their bags and board an army aircraft at Kirtland Air Field, New Mexico, for a direct flight to North Field, Tinian, by then the largest operational air base in the world.

#

More members of the “First Technical Service Detachment,” part of Little Boy team, arrived on Tinian that day. They were Lawrence M Langler (F.G.), Thomas H. Olmstead, (F.G.), Morton Camac, (C.G.), Charles P. Baker, (C.G.), Harold M. Agnew, (C.G.), G, Thorton T/3, W. L. Murphy, T/3, D. C. Harms, T/3, L. L. Motechko, T/4 and B. B. Bederson, Pvt., arrived on Green Hornet C-54 44-9019 at 1300.

Kirkpatrick also received good news for the 509^th and Project Alberta that day. General Farrell must have been in a good mood. He ended a debate that may have been trivial to Washington, but very important to the Project personnel on Tinian. All they were asking for was a few amenities, which had been previously denied as not necessary to the war effort. However, General Farrell, a combat veteran, understood the need. Moral was important. He attached a hand-written note to the following memo from Kirkpatrick to Captain Parsons, stating “I urge approval. They are normal in the theater.”

On basis of justification submitted by Kirkpatrick, General Groves has approved procurement of following equipment for Destination [Tinian]. Refrigerators as required for storage of project materials such as photographic film, etc and ship as component parts of kits. Refrigerators, total of six, family size type, be shipped for use of project personnel. The standard size electric range, quantity one, be shipped also for use of project personnel. (RG 77, Box 21)

Groves even attached his own “OK” to the memo. There would be ice for mixed drinks in the Project Alberta tents, if the war lasted long enough for the shipment to arrive.

Back in the States, the Fat Man scientists and technical personnel who had observed the test returned to Los Alamos and Wendover to prepare for their move to Tinian via Wendover, San Francisco, Hawaii, Johnston Island and Kwajalein. (Russ, p. 51)

As soon as Groves returned to his office in D.C., Harrison sent a quick follow-up cable to Stimson, re-confirming the Alamogordo success. Stimson received it on Tuesday, July 17 shortly after the first meeting of the Big Three.

Doctor [Groves] has just returned most enthusiastic and confident that the little boy [the uranium bomb ready for use against Japan] is as husky as his big brother [the plutonium bomb that was just tested. The light in his eyes was discernable from here [Washington, D.C.] to High Hold [Stimson’s summer home on Long Island, 250 miles away] and I could have heard his screams from here to my farm [near Upperville, Virginia, 50 miles away] (Mee, 1975, p. 106; Adams, 1985, p. 295).

Stimson walked over to the Little White House, where Truman was having dinner with General Marshall, General Arnold and Admiral King, who were opposed to the use of the bomb. President Truman said he would make no final decision on the issue until he received a final report from Groves. Nevertheless, Judge Truman, the poker player, had drawn an ace to fill a straight flush (Manhattan, p. 517).

At the time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were discussing the coming conference with their British and Russian counterparts. They were not aware that the test had been conducted and ended up spending much of the time discussing what should be done with the atomic bomb, if it proved to be successful. At the meeting, Admiral King stated he felt that a naval blockade would eventually starve the Japanese into surrender. Arnold thought his Army Strategic Air Force could bomb them into surrender. Marshall thought the Japanese should be warned before the bomb was dropped, but remained adamant that plans for the invasion of Kyushu should continue. General Eisenhower told Stimson that Japan was already utterly defeated. It was "completely unnecessary," and would only rouse world opinion against the United States. Admiral Leahy thought that perhaps the only reason it was being used was "because of the vast sums that had been spent on the project (Mee, 1975, p. 78)."

July 17

Early Tuesday morning, July 17, Stimson took Harrison's top secret cable to Secretary of State James Byrnes. At lunchtime he showed the message to Churchill, who later wrote of it, "Here then was a speedy end to the Second World War, and," referring to Stalin's advances in Europe, "perhaps to much else besides." They then met with General Marshall and Admiral Leahy to discuss the new development. "Up to this moment," wrote Churchill in 1953, "we had shaped our ideas towards an assault upon the homeland of Japan by terrific air bombing and by the invasion of very large armies. We had contemplated the desperate resistance of Japanese fighting to the death with Samurai devotion, not only in pitched battles, but in every cave and dug-out. I had in my mind the spectacle of Okinawa island, where many thousands of Japanese, rather than surrender, had drawn up in line and destroyed themselves by hand-grenades after their leaders had solemnly performed the rite of hara-kiri. To quell the Japanese resistance man by man and conquer the country yard by yard might well require the loss of a million American lives and half that number of British--or more if we could get them there; for we were resolved to share the agony. Now all this nightmare picture had vanished. In its place was a vision--fair and bright indeed it seemed-- of the end of the whole war in one or two violent shocks. I thought immediately myself of how the Japanese people, whose courage I had always admired, might find in the apparition of this almost supernatural weapon an excuse which would save their honour and release them from their obligation of being killed to the last fighting man.

"Moreover, we should not need the Russians. The end of the Japanese war no longer depended upon the pouring in of their armies for the final and perhaps protracted slaughter. We had no need to ask favours of them. . . . The array of European problems could therefore be faced on their merits and according to the broad principles of the United Nations. We seemed suddenly to have become possessed of a merciful abridgment of the slaughter in the East and of a far happier prospect in Europe. At any rate, there never was a moment's discussion as to whether the atomic bomb should be used or not. To avert a vast, indefinite butchery, to bring the war to an end, to give peace to the world, to lay healing hands upon its tortured peoples by a manifestation of overwhelming power at ht cost of a few explosions, seemed , after all our toils and perils, a miracle of deliverance.

British consent in principle to the use of the weapon had been given on July 4, before the test had taken place. The final decision now lay in the main with President Truman, who had the weapon; but I never doubted what it would be, nor have I ever doubted since that he was right. The historic fact remains, and must be judged in the after-time, that the decision whether or not to use the atomic bomb to compel the surrender of Japan was never even an issue. There was unanimous, automatic, unquestioned agreement around our table; nor did I ever hear the slightest suggestion that we should do otherwise (Churchill, 1953, p. 638-9)."

Stimson advised Churchill that Russia should be told of the bomb. But the Prime Minister of England was adamantly opposed. However, later that evening Truman had and opportunity to speak with Churchill privately. The Prime Minister changed his mind. He later wrote of the meeting, “Still, he [Stalin] had been a magnificent ally in the war against Hitler, and we both felt that he must be informed of the great new Fact which now dominated the scent, but not of any particulars. . . . ‘I think,’ he said, ‘I had best just tell him after one of our meetings that we have an entirely novel form of bomb, something quite out of the ordinary, which we think will have decisive effects upon the Japanese will to continue the war.’ I agreed to this procedure (Churchill, 1953, p. 649).”

Stimson then had a messenger summons Generals Marshall and Arnold, who were having lunch. Arriving at Stimson’s villa, they found the Secretary of War with Secretary McCloy and Mr. Bundy and were shown a copy of the message from Harrison (Arnold, 1949, p. 584).

Meanwhile, back in D.C., Groves, Farrell, Mrs. O’Leary and one other highly cleared secretary completed the final report on the Trinity test at about two o’clock in the morning. The general handed it to the special courier who had been anxiously standing by. The top-security courier was driven to a nearby airfield, where he boarded an aircraft that had also been standing by and flew directly to Potsdam, Germany, where Secretary of War Stimson, Army Chief of Staff General Marshall and President Truman had been anxiously awaiting his arrival. A conference between the big three—Truman, Churchill, and Stalin—called to decide the fate of the post-war world, was due to begin the following day and Truman wanted the results of the Trinity Test in his pocket before meeting with Stalin. Meanwhile, Farrell packed his bags and headed for Tinian to take command of operation “Centerboard,” the plan to drop atomic bombs on Japan.

General Groves’s day was not done. He was shortly informed that General Carl Arthur Spaatz, US Army Air Force, was leaving D.C. for Guam to become the new commanding officer of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific. Groves wasn’t too surprised. Spaatz had become commandeering officer U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe in January 1944. As such, he directed the strategic bombing campaign against Germany, including both the air campaigns conducted by the Eighth Air Force under Lieutenant General Jimmy Doolittle and the Fifteenth Air Force under Lieutenant General Nathan Twining. Twinning had already taken command of the 20^th Air Force on Guam. Doolittle was bringing 8^th Air Force to Okinawa where it would be retrained for B-29 operations. General LeMay became Spaatz’s deputy.

Groves caught up with Spaatz at the Pentagon and briefed him on the Trinity test, then outlined Operation Centerboard, the plans for the use of the two bombs. According to Groves, Spaatz agreed on all counts and told him to draft the order, which Groves promised to do.

Despite the speed with which the program was accelerating, some concern remained among some military leaders about Admiral Purnell’s one-two punch concept. By dropping two bombs quickly, as Purnell had proposed, the Japanese should become convinced that America had plenty and that the 509^th would continue dropping them every few days. Hopefully, the one-two punch would convince the Japanese leadership to make a decision quickly. However, there was only one Little Boy. None more were being produced. And, there was only enough plutonium for one Fat Man to be ready to use in time for the proposed one-two punch. Another Fat Man would not be ready for delivery against Japan until about August 24. Perhaps the bombs could be put to another use, thought some.

So little was known about the bombs or radiation at that time, General Marshall suggested stockpiling the bombs produced at Tinian until right before the invasion of Kyushu. Then, he would drop them on the invasion beaches just before the scheduled November 1 landings. If they worked, it would not only be the huge shocker the bombs were supposed to be, but it would also clear the invasion beaches of defenders.

Generally speaking however, the foremost thought in everyone’s mind within the Manhattan Project was the number of people who were dying every day in the Asian war. Some estimate as many as 5,000 in greater East Asia. Every time somebody said, “Let’s think about that for a day,” another 5,000 died. The best scientists, mathematicians, and machinists in the world said the odds were very favorable that both bombs would work. The military and civilian leadership were convinced that if they were dropped, the Japanese would quit. Therefore, despite feelings in some quarters, Project Alberta and Operation Centerboard pushed forward as quickly as possible after the Trinity test, moving the right men and proper materials to Tinian. Hopefully, all the leg-work done by Parsons and the others involved with shipping to “Destination” would have the line of communications cleared for the appearance of questionable civilians in the war zone.

Besides covering political events developing in Europe, newspapers across America reported that the joint Allied Navy commanded the waters surrounding Japan. For the third time in a short time, the American battleship Iowa and the British battleship King George V -- undaunted -- escorted the joint allied carrier fleet to the Japanese coastline – without contest. Under Nimitz’s command the free world’s combined sea and air power freely pummeled transport facilities in harbors around Hitachi, some 50 – 85 miles from Tokyo (Mee, p. 99).

Americans expressed frustration. The Japanese just would not quit, even though it was clear they were beaten. The Japanese navy had been cleared from the seas and the Allies were at her doorstep. The problem was that the Japanese army officers who controlled the government would not, could not, consider surrender any more than could a Japanese soldier in battle. Truman and Churchill were forced to assume the Japanese would never surrender until Tokyo was captured and the Japanese nation was laid to waste with a bloody armored invasion – unless the bomb worked. In which case, the war would be over in a couple weeks, and the job of putting the world back together again could begin – without Stalin’s involvement in Japan.

July 18

Tibbets arrived back on Tinian on July 18, having left the States on July 16, piloting the Green Hornet Wendover Special C-54 No. 27-2605 -- without having observed the Trinity Test. He touched down briefly on Guam early in the morning, checked in with LeMay, was informed by special message that the Trinity Test had been successful -- “Results blindingly impressive. Kilotons not yet firm, but probably ten plus or minus five (RG 77, Box 18). LeMay told him that the bomb parts were on their way to Tinian. “Apparently its pretty important. I want the best crew you’ve got to dop this first one. And that doesn’t necessarily mean you (Coffee, 1986, p. 179).” LeMay was sticking to the order that prevented anyone with knowledge of the bomb from flying over enemy territory.

LeMay didn’t blame Tibbets for insisting on flying the dangerous mission himself. “It was his prerogative to do it,” wrote LeMay later. If LeMay had been in Tibbets position, he would have done the same thing (Coffee, 1986, p. 179).

Tibbets then skipped south to Tinian, where he unloaded 33 pieces of cargo destined for the Project Alberta Ordnance Area. With his return, Tibbets automatically relieved his deputy, Colonel Tom Classen, and resumed active command of the 509^th. He would remain with them in the Marianas until well after the surrender.

His decision to return may have been influenced more by his good friend Tom Ferebee, rather than the plea from Parsons. Ferebee warned Tibbets that General LeMay’s operations officer, Colonel William “Butch” Blanchard had convinced General LeMay that the ultimate mission of the 509th, the dropping of the atom bomb, should be made by one of the more veteran B-29 crews, with combat experience over Japan, rather than one of the new-comers. Tibbets attempted to politely explain to Blanchard that he had just spent the last several months training the hand-picked crews of the 509^th to make a radical escape procedure he had designed for dropping the bomb. When Blanchard remained adamant, Tibbets suggested that he should fly along on a 509^th practice mission and experience it for himself, then decide. LeMay agreed. Tibbets piloted the as yet unnamed Enola Gay, along with his personal crew, on a Pumpkin run to Rota and made a perfect drop from 31,000 feet. As usual, he then cranked the wheel hard to the right and pushed down the nose. The aircraft quickly gain speed as it descended, then Tibbets began pulling it out of the dive, creating about 4 G’s vertical force and penning Blanchard into his seat.

Blanchard was convinced. He agreed that there was no one else in the regular 20^th Air Force qualified to fly the mission. According to Tibbets, “Blanchard was so glad to scramble out of the airplane that I heard no more from him or LeMay or anyone else about our qualifications to carry the bomb to Japan.” (Tibbets, p. 194)

On Tinian, parts for atomic bombs and the men who knew how to assemble and test them continued to arrive. All found problems that needed coordination with their stateside counterparts. Kirkpatrick found himself running to the wing communications shack more and more often every day. Although the Fat Man casing had arrived, the fusing and firing mechanism were still being modified as test drops continued to be made at Wendover.

Kirkpatrick could be decisive. When Batch II arrived improperly, jeopardizing the mission, he immediately request that “five gallons of 3M CP Q T manufactured by Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company be shipped to destination by air as soon as possible (RG 77, Box 19). By this time all five Green Hornets were flying daily missions back and forth from the States to the Marianas.

July 19

Small problems, which could become big problems, continued to plague the Project Alberta team. Kirkpatrick reported to Wendover that “No receivers came in 1^st air shipment. Batch 3 is to be available about 25 July. Send via air 4 rheostats, 5 Ohm, 5 Ampere. Letter will follow (RG 77, Box 19).

In another nasty-gram, Kirkpatrick complain about continued shipping problems slowing down operations. Time was getting short. The first drop was only two weeks away. The Bowery Three shipment had been loaded at San Francisco along with a load of aerial mines for the 313^th Wing. As a result, when Eagle Wing arrived on July 19, it had to anchor outside the harbor to unload the mines before the Project Alberta cargo could be unloaded. This regulation had been put in place after several LSTs exploded at dock in Pearl Harbor before the invasion of the Marianas. Munitions could no longer be unloaded at the dock. Now, Eagle Wing was not expected to dock and start unloading the Bowery Three shipment until at least July 23, four days lost.

As a result, Activity Five on the Project Alberta list of tests was rescheduled “to include a landing at Morgue (Iwo Jima), unloading there, simulated battery service, reloading and take-off with drop at Tinian. This test to be completed about 1 August.” Activity Five was essentially a dress rehearsal for the live Little Boy drop. The Project Alberta team would load a complete Little Boy mock up into Tibbets’ plane with all the parts in place except the atomic device. They would fly it to Iwo Jima, the planned rendezvous site and make a simulated emergency landing there. The Iwo Jima bomb pit and hard stands should be finished by then. If necessary during the real strike mission, they would removed the bomb from Tibbets’ plane and load it into another aircraft that would carry it to the target. After the practice landing on Iwo, Tibbets would return to Tinian and drop the test bomb just offshore so that the scientists to could see if it the practice detonators exploded at about the right altitude.

Regarding the delay due to improper shipping, Kirkpatrick wrote “Some action must be taken to correct this situation and get accurate lists out here before arrival of shipments (RG 77, Box 19).”

July 20

Despite some early reservations expressed by Groves, Tibbets’ request for “blockbuster” practice bombs was fulfilled. It became known as the “Pumpkin.” Reportedly, Captain Parsons and Dr. Charles C. Lauritsen, head of the support effort at the California Institute of Technology (Cal Tech or CIT), suggested the nickname “Pumpkin” for these high explosive replicas of Fat Man when they were designing them. Each had the same “ellipsoidal” shape as the final Fat Man Bomb and weighed about 10,525 pounds, including 6,300 pounds high explosives. The ellipsoidal shells were manufactured by two companies in Los Angeles, initially under a contract with Cal Tech, later under a contract with the Navy Bureau of Ordnance.  The tail assemblies were manufactured by a company in Detroit.  The shells and tail assemblies were shipped to the Naval Ammunition Depot at McAlester, Oklahoma. There, they were filled with 6,300 pounds of high explosives.  They were then packed in wooden boxes and shipped by rail car to the Naval Magazine at Port Chicago in the San Francisco Bay area to be shipped by boat to Tinian.  The only "assembly" work on Tinian for the Pumpkins was attaching the tail assembly to the shell and then installing three contact fuses in the nose after the bomb had been loaded into the front bomb bay of the B-29.

By July 20, sufficient Pumpkins had been assembled for the 509^th to participate in a major mission to Japan. LeMay gave Tibbets ten separate targets in Toyama, Fukushima, Tokyo, Otsu, Taira, Kobe and Nagoya. Tibbets assigned the targets to ten of his Silverplates. The mission briefings were much more realistic this time, compared to the previous training mission briefings in Cuba and Tinian. This time they would be flying over enemy territory. They would not be flying in a protective formation, as with the rest of the 313^th. Instead, they would be flying alone, this time over enemy territory.

The 509^th had been on Tinian for nearly a month and had not yet flown a combat mission. They were getting restless. They were getting tired of being harassed by other B-29 crews. Sgt. Spitzer described the mission as follows:

By this time we were getting pretty well pissed off when on the 20^th we got word of our first mission. We were joining the rest of the wing on a strike that night – 600 ships were going out – a record breaking amount. Our target would be [Fukushima] – we were going alone, four hours after the rest of the wing takes off.

At briefing we were told it was a soft touch – no flak, no fighters. After briefing chow – report to operations. There will be a truck to take us to the plane. Our first mission. What will it be like? Will they be right in their assumption – no flak, no fighters? – 13 hours in the air alone. The mind can certainly cover a lot of territory in a very short time. I tried to keep occupied, not to leave any room for thoughts that kept whirling in my mind.

We were now past Iwo Jima. Soon we would begin our climb to bombing altitude. One hour from the coast of the Japanese Empire. We donned our flak suits over the CL, Mae West and parachute.

There’s a little trouble with number 1 engine, smoke coming out. Number 3 is heading up too.

Eng to Pilot – 3 and 1acting up sir!

Nav. -- Radar – “Can you see the coast yet Ed”?

Ed -- “Just about coming in now Cap, about 75 miles out.

Eng -- “We better not take any chances.”

Pilot -- “What do you think?”

Eng -- “May have to feather #1.”

Ed -- “Coming in good now.”

Nav. -- “Let’s go in and drop the son of a bitch.”

Eng – “Let’s turn back.”

Nav – “God damn we are only 10 minutes away now”.

Eng -- #1 is smoking, #3 running hot and now #4 is running rough. We had better turn back.”

Nav -- “Only 30 miles out; 6 minutes.”

Bob -- “Well what’s it going to be?”

Pilot -- “O.K. We are going back. We’ll have to abort.”

Abort! Our first mission and only six minutes away from the coast line – that entire trip in vain – 13 hours and the Pacific ocean our target now. There will be others, true, but only 30 miles away – that hurt.

So back we went moaning and cursing our luck. The rest of the crews dropped theirs on the target. We were the only ones to abort. They saw no flak, no fighters. Major Sweeney had sat this one out and felt pretty bad over the whole thing (Spitzer, p. ).

With a wry sense of humor, one of the Silverplates flown on that same pumpkin missions, Straight Flush commanded by Claude Eatherly, was not able to bomb either its primary or secondary targets as a result of cloud cover and chose a “target of opportunity,” as the aircraft commander was technically allowed to do. However, his choice of the Imperial Palace in Tokyo was a bit beyond his authority. Fortunately for later activities, he missed on his radar run and hit a nearby railway station. No doubt, he would have been in some trouble had he actually hit his chosen target. (Campbell, p. 28)

Although the group took off one after the other, each aircraft commander was in charge of getting his aircraft to his target and dropping his Pumpkin. As they had practiced from their home base at Wendover, as each plane dropped its Pumpkin, the aircraft commander put the plane into its hard-diving turn to practice the escape mechanism – not knowing what they were supposed to be escaping.

Meanwhile, Tibbets assigned Major Charles Sweeney’s plane to convert The Great Artiste into an instrument ship. He and his crew would carry the scientific instrument team on the first atomic strike mission. The Great Artiste essentially became a flying laboratory, with all manner of special devises created by the scientists at Los Alamos to study the bomb in flight, test its radar fusing devise, and most important to Oppenheimer and his scientists -- record the effects of the blast. The 1^st Ordnance team immediately went to work installing their special, super-secret equipment into The Great Artiste. Dr. Luis Alvarez was given the assignment of designing and delivering the canisters to Tinian. Attached to a parachute, the canister would be dropped at the same time as the bomb. When the bomb exploded, specially designed instruments inside the canister would measure the strength of the blast and beam the information back to the instruments being installed in The Great Artiste.

#

Back in D.C., the General LeMay’s question about who could or could not fly on the strike missions was still being debated. LeMay was correct, in that a secret order had been issued two years before by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a result of a different secret project that was compromised. Dated August 6, 1943, it was designed to prevent people with entament knowledge of top secret projects from being captured by the enemy. It specifically stated that “Such personnel should not participate in preliminary landing operations or reconnaissance or in flights over the battle zone except in instances of absolute operation necessity (RG 77, Box 20).”

Colonel Paul Tibbets was, in fact, the only person in the 509^th who was aware that the bomb he was ordered to drop was an atomic bomb. He was also somewhat aware of how the bomb worked. To protect the atomic secret, some argued, the plane should be flown by a pilot who knew nothing about the contents of the bomb. Moreover, there should be no civilians on the plane, especially if they had any knowledge of the bomb, which would exclude the weaponeers and the physicists on the scientific measurement plane. Even if everyone in the plane died in the crash, an investigation would reveal that there were civilians flying on a B-29 in enemy territory; a violation of the Geneva Convention.

After reading the 1943 orders, Groves figured that his mission was as close to an “absolute operation necessity” as the nation could get. So, with Stimson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Germany, Groves called on his contact within the Joint Chief’s of Staff Major General H. A. Craig, then Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and Planning Division, War Department General Staff, with a draft order he wanted given to General Spaatz, Commanding General, U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces, giving his people an exemption to the 1943 order. It stated that:

The provisions of SECRET AGO Letter dated 6 August 1943, subject: “Security Measures to Prevent Leakage Regarding Future Operations through Prisoners of War,” AG 312.1 (2 Aug 1943) OB-S-E-M, will not apply to civilian and military personnel concerned with the “CENTERBOARD” project provided flights by such personnel are necessary to the operations of the project and provided they are specifically authorized by Major General L. R. Groves or his designated senior representative in the area in the cases of personnel not assigned under the tables of organization of the 509^th Composite Group, and by the Commanding General, U. S. Army Strategic Air Forces (Spaatz), or a senior officer designated by him in the case of Group personnel.

Groves gave the draft to Colonel Fisher to prepare as a War Department Cable. He then justified his draft to General Norstad, advising him that “the code word “Centerboard” has been designated and registered with Joint Security Control, which meant that commanders in the field would recognize it without further clarification. To maintain secrecy, Groves added, “This will not be reduced to writing hereafter nor appear in dispatches of any sort. It will simply be identification between OPD and Joints Chiefs of Staff.” Apparently Groves had already made the right calls, because he told Norstad that General Craig will have the Joint Chiefs of Staff secretariat directed to clear the initial five civilians who had to leave for Tinian shortly.

Groves added that on Tuesday General Craig will request General George Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral Ernest King, U.S. Navy Chief of Staff, both of whom were in Potsdam, to send a message to Admiral Nimitz, asking him to give blanket clearance for all personnel in order to avoid delay and spreading of the names all over the theater. Groves cryptically ended the message by advising Norstad that “The project will be identified to Adm. Nimitz by referring to the letter of 27 Jan. 1945 delivered to him by Cmdr. Ashworth [Admiral King’s initial letter]. Nimitz reply will serve as authority to move in the future without theater clearance (RG 77, Box 21).” Colonel de Silva had been requesting this clearance for weeks.

July 21

Meanwhile, President Truman had moved into his temporary “White House” in Germany, anxiously awaiting Groves’ final report on the Trinity test. A courier handed it to Mr. Stimson’s aide, Colonel Kyle, who delivered it to the Secretary at 11:35 p.m., July 21, Berlin time (Mee, 1975, p. 153). Stimson read the report carefully, then found General Marshall free about 3:00 a.m., and let him read it. Afterwards, Stimson carried it over to the Villa that President Truman was occupying. There he found Secretary of State Byrnes with the president and read it out loud to both of them. Groves estimated the energy generated by the bomb to be in excess of the equivalent of 15,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT.

“A massive cloud was formed which surged and billowed upward with tremendous power, reaching the sub-stratosphere at an elevation of 41,000 feet, 36,000 feet about the ground, in about five minutes, breaking without interruption through a temperature inversion at 17,000 feet which most of the scientists thought would stop it."

General Farrell had added his description of the Trinity explosion:

The effects could well be called unprecedented, magnificent, beautiful, stupendous and terrifying. No man-made phenomenon of such tremendous power had ever occurred before. The lighting effects beggared description. The whole country was lighted by a searing light with the intensity many times that of the midday sun. It was golden, purple, violet, gray and blue. It lighted every peak, crevasse and ridge of the nearby mountain range with a clarity and beauty that cannot be described but must be seen to be imagined. It was that beauty the great poets dream about but describe most poorly and inadequately. Thirty seconds after the explosion came, first the air blast pressing hard against the people and things, to be followed almost immediately by the strong, sustained, awesome roar which warned of doomsday and made us feel that we puny things were blasphemous to dare tamper with the forces heretofore reserved to The Almighty (Mee, 1975, p. 154-5).”

One can only imagine, or maybe one cannot imagine, the images that went through the mind of President Truman as he attempted to visualize the event Groves and Farrell had witnessed. Stimson said that both Truman and Byrnes "were immensely pleased. The President was tremendously pepped up by it. . . . He said it gave him an entirely new feeling of confidence and he thanked me for having come to the conference and being present to help him in this way (Mee, 1975, p. 155)" After thinking it over, Truman, Byrnes and Stimson decided to keep the information to themselves for that day’s negotiations, which Truman later said went quite well. A feeling seemed to develop that no matter what else might happen in the war, America now had the means to insure its speedy conclusion and save thousands of American lives (Frank 1999, p. 261).

Groves’ Trinity Test report was then immediately transmitted to General Spaatz, who passed it on to General Farrell, Captain Parsons, General LeMay and Tibbets. All the theater commanders were now aware that the bomb was no longer a scientific dream, but a real weapon of unimaginable destructive power.

The following day, at Truman’s direction, Stimson took Groves report to Churchill. Stimpson’s diary records Churchill’s reaction to the Groves report:

"He told me that he had noticed at the meeting of the Three yesterday that Truman was much fortified by something that had happened, that he had stood up to the Russians in a most emphatic and decisive manner, telling them as to certain demands that they could not have and that the United States was entirely against them. He [Churchill] said:

“Now I know what happened to Truman yesterday. I couldn’t understand it. When he got to the meeting after having read this report, he was a changed man. He told the Russians just where they got on and off and generally bossed the whole meeting.” (Quoted in Groves, p. 304)

The report indicating the full extent of the test, and advising that the first bomb would be ready to drop on Japan by July 31 certainly allowed Truman and Churchill to proceed with the drafting of the Potsdam Declaration, the demand that Japan surrender unconditionally, with a much greater degree of vigor than they had felt only a few days earlier. He had time. There were many issues to discuss with the Russians over agreements that had been made previously Between Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill, regarding the disposition of captured territories after the war. And, Truman knew that Stalin was driving his armies toward the Manchurian boarder for a rapid advance into northern Japan, probably on August 15. Not only did Truman now know that he could end the war in Japan, quickly, before Russia could invade Japan and claim territory there, he also knew that he held the biggest gun at the table and could control the course of international relations in the post war world, in as much as he wanted to.

Of the use of the bomb, Churchill later wrote:

Up to this moment we had shaped our ideas towards an assault upon the homeland of Japan by terrific air bombing and by the invasion of very large armies. We had contemplated the desperate resistance of the Japanese fight to the death with Samurai devotion . . . in every cave and dug-out . . . To quell the Japanese resistance man by man and conquer the country yard by yard might well require the loss of a million American lives and half that number of British--or more if we could get there: for we were resolved to share the agony. Now, all this nightmare picture had vanished. In its place was the vision—fair and bright indeed it seemed—of the end of the whole war in one or two violent shocks. (Quoted in Mee, p. 84)

That same day, July 21, Stimson’s special assistant George L. Harrison forwarded the following advice to the Secretary, obviously on behalf of Groves and the Target Selection Committee. They still wanted Kyoto to be a primary target:

All your local military advisors engaged in preparation definitely favor your pet city [Kyoto] and would like to feel free to use it as first choice if those on the ride select it out of the possible spots in the light of local conditions at the time.

Stimson responded tersely, “Give name of alternate places, always excluding the particular place against which I have decided. My decision has been confirmed by highest authority [the president].” Kyoto was subsequently replaced by Nagasaki. (Manhattan, p. 530)

#

The factor that most complicated settling issues at Potsdam, Germany, was the continuing war against Japan, to which Russia was not a party. It still appeared to all major Allied military planners that a full-scale invasion of Japan would be necessary to force Japan into the unconditional surrender. Russia had previously committed to entering the war 90 days after Germany surrendered. They had already moved several divisions to the Manchurian boarder, and were prepared for a Blitzkrieg to Japan. If they landed on Northern Honshu, they could lay claim to it at the peace negotiations, just as they were doing with Germany. Truman now had the power to end the war before the Russians could get in the war. He was betting on two atomic bombs, one of which was highly probable to work.

After reading the Frank Report and Stimson’s Interim Committee response, regarding how the bomb should be put to use, Truman and Churchill decided that:

1. There would be no public international demonstration of the bombs and their effects prior to combat use.
2. The bombs would be used in combat against the Japanese Empire without any advance warning to the enemy.
3. The bombs would be used against the military target cities Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, and Nagasaki, with priority in the order named, if possible.
4. The target cities named were reserved for strike missions only by the 509^th Composite Group, in order that bomb effects against previously undamaged targets could be adequately assessed.
5. By directive from Secretary of War Stimson to General Carl Spaatz, Chief of the newly created Strategic Air Force, Spaatz was ordered to have the 509^th Group deliver its first Special Bomb against of the four targets as soon after August 3^rd as weather permitted visual bombing. The 509^th was to deliver additional bombs on the target cities as soon as they were available.
6. Announcements regarding use of the bombs were to be issued only by the President or the Secretary of War. [This confirmed the draft prepared by Groves and previously approved by Handy.]

Because the Mod 2 X unit had not yet arrived from Raytheon Corporation, Activity A-9, the test drop for this new detonation device was also postponed. All other events were on schedule. Overall, they were ready for the active Little Boy drop on August 5. The senior Manhattan Project personnel were arriving in the theater. Admiral Purnell had arrived on Guam and was meeting with Admiral Nimitz and General Spaatz regarding the pending atomic missions, before moving into their tents on Tinian by July 26 or 27 (RG 77, Box 19).

Lt. Col. Pere de Silva advised General Groves that the uranium target for the Little Boy bomb was ready to be shipped. It would leave Albuquerque between July 24 and 28 in one of three Green Hornet ATC C-54s, depending on when the parts arrived from Los Alamos. The core of the FM sphere, he added, “will be carried in two ATC C-54 airplanes from Albuquerque to Destination. It will be guarded in the same manner as the target (RG 77 Box 19).” De Silva said he would ride in one airplane. Another intelligence officer would ride in each of the others. The material containers “will be guarded by one or more of these officers from the time custody is taken at Albuquerque until it is placed under CIC armed guard at Destination [Tinian].”

De Silva also advised Tinian that the Fat Man the sphere assemblies would be flown from Kirtland to Tinian on two B-29s of the 509th Group. A third B-29 would accompany these with accessories. Again, an intelligence officer would ride in each airplane, “and will cause the two spheres to be properly shrouded during any servicing and stops en route.” The proposed date of this shipment was “now 28 July, plus or minus 2 days.” Two other B-29s would accompany the high explosive charges. One would carry “some practice, non-quality HE. The third airplane will accompany the two main B-29s carrying the high quality castings for the initial FM (RG 77, Box 19).”

Groves asked General Spaatz to issue the necessary instructions to have the three B-29s fly their “special shipments of critical material” directly to Tinian. Two replacement B-29 airplanes were standing by at Wendover to carry the Fat Man castings and one B-29 used for training at Kirtland would fly as a back up. They were ordered to fly only in good weather “since their loss would have a serious effect on the time schedule of our project.”

Groves then reminded General George, commanding officer of the Air Transport Command, “I want to reiterate the absolute necessity of flying the airplanes only in good weather. As I stated to you, what is desired is first, maximum reliability and second, maximum speed of delivery. (RG 77, Box 3, file #5C-3)

That evening, at the end of a long and exhausting day, Elmer Kirkpatrick sat down to write his periodic-report to Groves. “On the whole,” he reported, “things are still good. We have our troubles but thus far they have been solved or are in the process of being solved. . . Construction is substantially complete. . . . The last Quonset is practically up and the third assembly building will be ready for use ahead of the August 1^st completion date.”

The power generators that were supposed to arrive in late June had not arrived. Kirkpatrick had scrounged three small generators. “Lights in the administration building are cared for by a 5 KW PutPut and the rest of the area are without service.”

“We have had the full-hearted cooperation of both the Wing and the Bomber Command. Without their help, I seriously doubt if our Group’s potential combat efficiency would have been near so good as it is now. These organizations have competent staffs that know their business.” Others had not been so helpful. A few of the people in the Group had acted like spoiled children. “Col Tibbets arrived 18^th July. He has been alarmed by some of the reports and is taking action to straighten things out. It is to be regretted that he was so late in joining his command: his prolonged absence has made it difficult for every one here.” Although Tibbets showed respect to LeMay, “he is being a bit cocky with lesser staff officers. However, he plays his cards well.”

The Intermediate Base at Iwo Jima was complete except the fill for the hardstand and surfacing. The B-29 strips there were well underway. He planned on returning with Cdr. Ashworth and Col Tibbets for another examination. “Status – on schedule. No apparent delaying factors (RG 77, Box 21).”

July 22

Originally, Tibbets tactical plan for the use of the bomb called for him to fly a single aircraft to the target, drop the bomb and return. If anything went wrong on the way up, he would stop at Iwo Jima, change planes, and continue the mission. He, like LeMay, was confident that a single plane flying high would be perceived as a weather aircraft and draw no attention. But the scientists felt they were getting cheated out of a second, or third, atomic experiment. LeMay had already agreed to the instrument plane, The Great Artiste. On July 22 General LeMay agreed to give the scientists a second plane, an observation aircraft equipped with an experimental camera designed to film the exact instant of the explosion. The scientists were drooling over the idea of catching a picture of the moment mass became energy: E = MC² personified. Oppenheimer’s Project Alberta team now had but a few days to take advantage of the opportunity (RG 77, Box 19).

July 23

The first Little Boy test drop, event A-2 for the Project Alberta team was successfully completed successfully -- “in all respects” -- on July 23. Like a great open-air physics lab, the test bomb was flown off what the Seabees had called Strip Number 1, built atop the old Japanese Hagoi Air Field. Tibbets dropped L-1 from 30,300 feet, close enough to the northwestern coast of Tinian so that observers along the cliffline could record its flight and monitor its the various bomb parts. There had been some concern that the electrical system and radar altitude system might perform differently in the Pacific climate than they had in the dry New Mexico and California deserts. Because other tests were being conducted at Wendover and Inyokern at the same time, it was necessary to communicate the results of tests in all three locations to counterparts in the other locations. The report on the L-1 drop was handed to Col. Kirkpatrick, who took it to the 313th Bomb Wing Communications Center, where it was sent to General LeMay’s office on Guam, where it was forwarded to Major Derry in D.C., who handed a copy to Mrs. O’Leary for General Groves, who then forwarded it to Dr. Oppenheimer. In this case, “Destination” reported that the radar altimeter system had worked perfectly at the prescribed altitude (RG 77, Box 20). The electrical system had worked correctly and the bomb had “exploded” at the correct altitude. Despite the complicated delivery for messages, the channels of communication between the various Manhattan Project headquarters had been sufficiently cleared to allow recipients to receive messages and respond within 24 hours.

With the successful L-1 drop, the Tinian base became fully operational according to Parsons’ plan. The 509th Composite Bombardment Group was operational. The Technical Service Detachment was on line in the Ordinance Area, piecing together Pumpkins for the practice missions to Japan. And, the Project Alberta team was working tirelessly but comfortably in the air conditioned assembly buildings Kirkpatrick had so ingeniously managed to construct, assembling test bombs. All the pieces were in place for the first Centerboard mission -- except for the critical materials and the final Fat Man detonations system, that is.

General Groves then visited with General Spaatz, who was headed to Guam and told him about the planned atomic mission. Apparently Spaatz went to see General Thomas T. Handy, General Marshall’s deputy to discuss the mission. “I told General Handy,” said Spaatz in 1962, “that I would not go out to the Pacific for the purpose assigned without notifying both Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur with regard to the atomic bomb. That was related to General Marshall (at Potsdam) and it was agreed that I should notify them. I also made further notification that I would not drop an atomic bomb on verbal orders—they had to be written—and this was accomplished” Apparently Spaatz thought the use of the bomb was not necessary; that the continued use of conventional weapons would eventually bring about surrender. He wanted the moral decision to come from someone else (Metz, 1988, p. 303.).

Groves then drafted the written directive for Operation Centerboard. It read:

1. The 509^th Composite Group, 20^th Air Force will deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki. To carry military and civilian scientific personnel from the War Department to observe and record the effects of the explosion of the bomb, additional aircraft will accompany the airplane carrying the bomb. The observing planes will stay several miles distant from the point of impact of the bomb.

2. Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project staff. Further instructions will be issued concerning targets other than those listed above.

3. Dissemination of any and all information concerning the use of the weapon against Japan is reserved to the Secretary of War and the President of the United States. No communiqués on the subject or release of information will be issued by Commanders in the field without specific prior authority. Any news stories will be sent to the War Department for special clearance. (RG 77, box 3 holds Groves’ draft which did not include Nagasaki or paragraph 4.)

4. The foregoing directive is issued to you by direction and with the approval of the Secretary of War and of the Chief of Staff, USA. It is desired that you personally deliver one copy of this directive to General MacArthur and one copy to Admiral Nimitz for their information. (Groves, 1962, p. 308; Manhattan, p. 534)

Groves then took it to Lt. General Thomas Troy Handy, General Marshall’s deputy, who signed it. The following day, Groves forwarded it to General Marshall in Potsdam for final approval and handed one copy directly to General Spaatz to hand-carry to Guam (Coffee, p. 177).

July 24

The following morning, Tibbets used the plane later named Jabit III for the next Little Boy test drop, event A-3. Kirkpatrick reported that this drop was successful, except a significant problem had developed with the plane; the electric bomb release mechanism failed on two runs. On the second run, when the electrical release failed, Tibbets ordered the bombardier to release the bomb manually. The electrical system on the plane and in the bomb had checked out satisfactorily prior to take off. When they tested the system after they were back on the ground, it functioned perfectly. “No obvious reason for failure can now be determined.” A similar failure occurred on one aircraft on a Pumpkin mission over the empire that day. Again, a check on the ground after mission showed that the electrical release system operated perfectly (RG 77, Box 19). This meant that the bombardier on the real mission would have to be prepared for a manual release, should the electrical system fail. However, the delayed reaction would cause the bomb to miss its target by some distance. Uncertainties like these gave fits to the scientists and technicians.

While Tibbets was dropping the Little Boy test bomb, ten more Silverplates flew Pumpkin missions to Ogaki, Fukushima, Niihama, Kobe, Otsu, and Yokkaichi. As with the previous practice missions, some succeeded and some failed. However, each crew gained experience over enemy territory. Some found out what flak looked like.

Finally that day, July 24, General Groves updated General Marshall with a detailed Plan of Operation – Atomic Fission Bomb. He asked the General to approve the plan and have appropriate orders issued for the use of the bomb.

1. First operation. The first gun-type atomic fission bomb should be ready to take off from the base at Tinian between 1 August and 10 August 1945. As soon after the readiness date as the weather is suitable, the bomb will be delivered on a target in Japan by a specially modified B-29 airplane of the 509^th Composite Group, 20^th Air Force. The explosive effect is now expected to exceed that of 10,000 tons of TNT and can well be as much as 30,000.

2. Assembly. The bomb will be finally assembled at Tinian by a special technical group of civilian and military scientific personnel from the project.

3. Targets. At least three targets should be available. Hiroshima, Kokura and Niigata have been reserved as targets for the first bombs. Niigata is the most unfavorable because of its location on the far side of Japan. The targets provide sufficient geographical spread to insure, as far as possible, that weather closure after the take-off of the airplane cannot prevent delivery of the bomb.

4. Delivery. The first mission will be carried out by visual bombing in daylight and it may be necessary to wait several days after the readiness date for suitable weather. The bomb will be dropped from a height not less than 30,000 feet above the ground to avoid possible damage to the airplane from the blast. The bombs will be detonated by radar proximity fuses at the heights which should produce the maximum blast damage, for the gun type about 2000 feet above the ground. The airplane carrying the bomb will be accompanied by two additional B-29 airplanes carrying scientific personnel with the necessary complicated instruments to observe and record the effects of the detonation. The observing airplanes will be required to stay several miles away from the point of impact of the bomb. No other friendly aircraft will be in the immediate vicinity.

In the airplane carrying the bomb there will be two officers from the project technical group who are qualified by familiarity with the design, development and technical features of the bomb to render final judgment in the event that an emergency requires deviation from the tactical plan [which will happen on the Nagasaki mission]. The senior technical officer on the first flight will be either Captain W. S. Parsons, U.S.N., or his alternate, Commander F. L. Ashworth, U.S.N.

5. Official Communiqués. Dissemination of information concerning the use of the weapon against Japan is reserved to the Secretary of War and the President of the United States. No communiqués on the subject or releases of information will be issued by Commanders in the field without specific authority.

6. Later Operations. The first implosion type bomb should be ready at Tinian base by about 6 August; but initially there must be a gap of three days between successive bombs of all types [to give the Japanese a chance to surrender]. The second implosion bomb should be ready 24 August. It is planned that they will be delivered in the same manner as the gun type bomb on the targets named above, probably excluding the one attacked by the gun type bomb. They will be detonated about 1500 feet above the ground. It is expected that each will have an effect equal to that of 15,000 tons of TNT.

Additional bombs will be ready for delivery at an accelerating pace, increasing from about three in September to possibly seven in December, with a sharp increase in production expected early in 1946. The sharp increase to seven in December is dependent upon the modification of the present implosion bomb which used plutonium only to one using a combination of plutonium and uranium 235. This appears to be thoroughly sound and to offer no difficulty in production. All bombs will be delivered by the 509^th Composite Group on targets having a high priority at the time of delivery. Instructions concerning such targets will be issued through the Commanding General, U. S. Army Strategic Air Force.

7. Organization. Major General L. R. Groves has overall direction of the atomic fission bomb project. Brigadier General T. F. Farrell, General Groves’ deputy, and Rear Admiral W. R. Purnell, the Navy member of the Military Policy Committee, will be at the base prior to the first mission to coordinate the project with Army and Navy Commanders in the theatre.

8. The Air Forces operations will be under the command of General Spaatz, commander U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces. The 20^th Air Force is under the command of Major General Curtis LeMay. The 509th Composite Group is under the command of Colonel Paul Tibbets.

9. On my recommendation the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently reserved the three cities from attack by any of our forces pending further instructions from them.

It is recommended that you approve the above plan of operations and issue a tentative directive to General Spaatz for action with copies to General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz for their information. Final approval with modifications, if desired, can be given later. A draft of the tentative directive and of a necessary section by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are attached, Tabs “B” and “C”. L. R. Groves, Major General, U.S.A. (RG 77, Box 3)

Considering that there were hundreds of individual parts and tools necessary to assemble each of the two very different bombs, and that they were being shipped from various points of origin in mainland America, it was inevitable that some wouldn’t make it -- or need to be replaced at the last minute by a new model. Fortunately, Tibbets had asked for and received the five four-engine C-54s now affectionately referred to as the “Green Hornet Line.” Because of this forethought, Tibbets’ little personal transport squadron was available and prepared to play its vital role in the final rush to get the bombs ready to drop. As an example, just two weeks before the planned delivery, July 24, Dike requested a spare “Hanna Cylinder.” This was a cylinder actuated by the hand controlled air valves. The piston had failed because the yoke fastened to the main air control valve was not long enough. They were jury rigging what they had, but asked for a spare set of hand control valves. They also needed four additional ratchet wrenches, because only two were included with the total of three lifts here. Finally they needed fifty studs one inch longer than standard for the sway braces (RG 77, Box 19).

In Potsdam on July 24, Secretary of War Stimson advised President Truman that the bomb would be ready to drop after August 3. The president thought this perfect. He wanted to wait for Chiang Kai-shek to read and approve the Proclamation and be a co-signer. As soon as he had that in hand, he would send out the Proclamation. Once again Stimson urged the president to letting the Japanese know that they could retain their emperor. Truman said he would keep an eye on the situation as it developed. Stimson then headed for the door, his participation in the conference ended (Mee, 1975, p. 208-9).

July 25

Oppenheimer also became concerned about getting the final critical Little Boy parts to Tinian. Three B-29s had been identified for this mission from Wendover to Tinian. He asked Parsons “Do you require, considering difficulty of recovery in event of night mishap, that day travel is mandatory?” He then advised Parsons that unless otherwise directed, the B-29 crews and couriers will be instructed to remain with their aircraft in event of mishap until their precious cargo could be transferred to another plane. “Request answers by telephone today (RG 77, Box 20).” Marginal notes to this message, perhaps made during the requested phone call, clarify that if something happened to one of the three planes en route, meeting the scheduled arrival date on Tinian justified proceeding with all the parts in one or two aircraft. Day travel was no longer a luxury and therefore not mandatory. And, yes, crews and carriers will remain with a disabled air craft as long as may take.

Apparently the orders Groves had drafted for the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not made its way from Germany to Guam. Kirkpatrick complained to General Echols again on July 25, complaining about the continuing problem with General LeMay about who was going to fly the first atomic mission. Kirkpatrick reported that the final Little Boy teams were being trained. However, the one “headed by Yoke (Tibbets) cannot fly under Cannon’s (LeMay’s) present instructions. Yoke advised Cannon that restrictions on necessary personnel had been removed. Cannon wants confirmation (RG 77 Box 19).”

Nevertheless, Tibbets proceeded with the test drop plan. This time he released L-5 from Jabit III. As he had with the previous drops, Harlow Russ tested the barometric fusing systems personally as the bombs were assembled and dropped (Project Alberta, p. 53). There were six of these baro-switches mounted on the forward face of a bulkhead inside the tail cone area of the bomb. The fusing and firing systems had been tested on the 24^th with L-2. As with L-1 and L-2, L-5 exploded at the precise altitude for which it was designed. All three drops had been successful in all respects, except for the glitch in the electronic release on L-2.

#

The president did try to tell Marshall Stalin about the bomb, sort of, as Stimson and some others had urged him to do. While with Stalin on the 25^th (Churchill, p. 670 says the 24^th) Truman told him, almost as an aside, that America had a new weapon of unusually destructive force. According the Truman, Stalin simply smiled and told Truman to put it to good use. Truman took this to mean that Stalin knew nothing of the atomic bomb. In fact, as we have read, Stalin had spies at Los Alamos that had kept Russia aware of American progress on the bombs. Stalin may have actually been aware of the Trinity test. In the least, Truman could say he had been an honest ally.

Stalin’s reaction to Truman’s non-announcement became a bit of international intrigue. The U. S. Military Attaché in London sent Groves the following Top Secret message:

Ripley (Russia) has been advised according to information received here a few minutes ago with the comment “He smiled approval.” Can you give us any more information? Those here quite excited. Request instructions or advice that instructions unnecessary. Request we not be left in the position of knowing less than our opposite numbers about the situation. Action Groves (RG 77, Box 19)

Marshal Zhukov later wrote, "On returning to his quarters after this meeting, Stalin, in my presence, told Molotov about his conversation with Truman. The latter reacted immediately; 'Let them. We'll have to talk it over with Kurchatov and get him to speed things up.' I realized they were talking about research on the atomic bomb (Mee, 1975, p. 222)."

Before the seventy-seven-year-old Secretary of War Stimson left Potsdam that day for D.C., his work there being finished, President Truman reviewed with him the order to drop the bomb as drafted by Groves and amended by Stimson. He noted that Kyoto had been replaced by Nagasaki as a target, as Stimson had requested. Then he told Stimson that he approved the issuance of the order to “set the military wheels in motion.” However, Stimpson was to advise Groves that the president reserved the right to revoke the order at any time the Japanese should decide to accept the unconditional surrender terms he would issue.

Then, with the Commander-in-Chief’s approval, Secretary of War Stimson issued the final directive for the use of the bomb. It would be signed in D.C. by General Thomas T. Handy for General Marshall, the US Army Chief of Staff, who was still in Potsdam. The wheels were in motion.

July 26, 1945 – Potsdam, Germany

President Harry S. Truman toured the wreckage of Berlin. Depressed by what he had seen and imagining the destruction Japan was suffering, he returned to his villa to find Secretary Stimson waiting for him. In his hand was a message from Chiang Kai Shek, agreeing to the hard-worded terms of the ultimatum the Allies were about to give Emperor Hirohito. Drafted by largely by Groves and Stimson, the message attempted to tell the emperor that he would not lose his throne if his army would lay down its arms. Still, the term “unconditional” remained central to the surrender demand. With the Generalissimo’s approval, the document was released to the media at 7:00 p.m. that evening. It was published in all major newspapers and broadcast around the world, and in particular to Japan in Japanese. It read in part:

We, the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war. . . . This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the allied nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to exist. . . . The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will (emphasis added in the original) mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

1. There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

4. The Japanese military forces, after being completely dis-armed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

7. The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

8. We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction (Quoted in Mee, p. 265).

The United States leadership was aware that there were those in Japan who might be willing to accept surrender as long as the Emperor system was allowed to remain in place. That was the reason for modifying the demand for unconditional surrender with the phrase “of all the Japanese forces.” Unfortunately, the Japanese army remained adamantly opposed to surrender.

July 26, 1945 -- Tinian

July 26 was also a big day on Tinian. It began with another ten-aircraft Pumpkin raid on Japan. This time their targets included Shimoda, the original American treaty port negotiated by Commodore Perry in 1854, Toyama, Yaizu, Tsugawa, Osaka, Hamamatsu, Hitachi, Kashiwazki, and Koriyama. While the 509^th in the air, the USS Indianapolis arrived at Tinian Harbor, Marianas, and anchored about a half mile off shore. The newly refurbished cruiser had set a new trans-Pacific speed record, San Francisco to Tinian in only 10 days, even with a brief stop at Hawaii. The crew of the Indianapolis unloaded the 15-foot-long, 10,000-pound crate containing the Little Boy body onto the deck of an LST. Then, men struggled to climb down the ladder that dangled over the side of the great cruiser, handling a canister containing the projectile slug of Uranium-235. They were Captain Charles H. O’Brien, the official M.E.D. courier who had traveled on board the ship, Major Robert R. Furman and Captain James F. Nolen, an M.D. listed as a radiological specialist. Once on terra ferma, the group and their cargo were taken under heavy guard directly to the bomb assembly building, where the “hot” cargo was stored. Indianapolis remained on Tinian only about three and a half house, then steamed to Guam for a day’s rest for the crew.

If that wasn’t enough excitement for Project Alberta, that afternoon all three Green Hornets carrying Project Alberta personnel arrived on Tinian. Secretly moving the scientists to Tinian had not been easy. Arriving at Kirtland Airbase from Los Alamos by bus, they were allowed to take a shower and then issued standard U. S. Army uniforms. Suddenly, according the military ID he was issued, Lawrence Johnston became a captain in the US Army Air Force. Dr. Alvarez became a Colonel. Their civilian clothes and wallets were stuffed in a bag to be sent to their next of kin with no explanation. At Kirtland they boarded a Green Hornet for the long ride to Tinian. Captain Parsons and Ensign George T. Reynolds arrived aboard C-54 number 449007 (RG 77, Box 17). Another Green Hornet carried the core of the Project Alberta physics team: Dr. Norman Ramsey, Louis W. Alvarez, Roger Warner, Henry Linschitz, Robert Serber, Lawrence H. Johnston, Arthur B. Machen, Dr. Nora Asey, T/3 Eugene L. Nooker, T/4 Frank J. Fortine, T/3 Vincent Calsea, and T/3 Arthur W. Collins. (RG 77, Box 17; Box 19). The third Green Hornet carried Los Alamos scientist Raemer Schreiber and the plutonium core for Fat Man in a small magnesium carrying case.

Shortly after landing, they were loaded unceremoniously into trucks and transported to the 509^th Compound. There, they and their baggage were dumped off at the prescribed tent. Some asked to see the ordnance area. Not far from their compound, they turned off the taxiway into a large barbed wire enclosed area. Inside were several recently constructed warehouses and Quonset Huts. Armed guards patrolled the fence with sub-machine guns. Back out on the road and a little further north they came to the assembly buildings.

The Plutonium core was safely stored:

At one end of the hut was stored the plutonium core for the bomb. It was kept in a cast aluminum close-fitting case with a thermometer sticking out of the top. A guard was posted 24-7 to watch that box. The guards freaked out later when they found out later the little box they had been guarding was the active part of a bomb that would destroy a city. (Krauss, p.108)

Kirkpatrick was pleased to report to Groves that evening that the Project Alberta team was fitting in well. With most of the critical parts for both bomb on Tinian and the Project Alberta team complete, the Fat Man drop was being pushed forward. This meant completion of the Intermediate Base on Iwo Jima had to be accelerated, but that was no problem in his opinion. He had also determined that the intermediate base would only need to be manned for two or three days immediately before and during atomic missions. That should not delay continued work on future bombs. Kirkpatrick took the time to commend Larkin, Dawson and Zimmerli for their excellent work. “This is especially true of Larkin who thus far has worked out perfectly in all respects (RG 77, Box 17)

Apparently the new plan to send three planes on the atomic strike mission was still under discussion. Tibbets was advised that after discussions with General Groves it was decided that the two other aircraft should maintain a linear distance of at least six miles from the bomb-carrying plane and should avoid an area one mile in radius directly over point of fire. They did not want the planes flying through the mushroom cloud, which would very likely be very radioactive. “Time of rise [for the cloud] should be figured as between one and three minutes (RG 77, Box 18).”

And, as requested by General LeMay some time ago, Tibbets and Parsons gave Kirkpatrick the final list of officers who would be on the actual flight teams.

Team 1 [The Little Boy-carrying aircraft]: Judge [Captain W. S. Parsons, USN]; Yoke [Colonel Paul W. Tibbets], 0361713, Aircraft Commander; Captain Robert A. Lewis, 0668015, Co-pilot; Major Thomas W. Ferebee, 0443490, Bombardier; Captain Theodore J. Van Kirk, 0659024, Navigator and First Lt. Jacob (none) Beser, 0855461, R.C.M. Officer [added in by hand is] Lt. Morris R. Jeppson, 0868346, Elec. OBS.

Team 2 [the Fat Man carrying aircraft]: Scathe [Comdr. F. L. Ashworth, USN]; Major Charles W. Sweeney, 0430633, aircraft commander; First Lieutenant Charles D. Albury, 0807658, Co-pilot; Captain Kermit K. Beahan, 0432331, Bombardier; Captain James F. Van Pelt, Jr., 0390421, Navigator. [Added in hand is] 2^nd Lt. Phillip M. Barnes, Elec. OBS (RG 77, Box 21)

This means that as early as July 26, Colonel Tibbets had decided that he would only fly the Little Boy mission, giving the Fat Man mission, if and when it happened, to Chuck Sweeney, the current 393^rd Squadron Commander, who had no combat experience other than the Pumpkin runs he had made since arriving on Tinian, rather than Colonel Tom Classen, the man who had created the 393^rd, who was currently Deputy Commander of the 509^th and who was a decorated combat pilot.

General Farrell was about the last member of the Manhattan Project to leave Washington for Tinian. Once there, he would assume command of the Manhattan Project “in the field.” As he preparing to leave, he was given the following orders from the War Department (Secretary Stimson), Office of the Chief of Staff (General Marshall). It was a memorandum for none other than General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific and General Carl Spaatz, the Commanding General. U. S. Army Strategic Air Forces and all their subordinate commanders. It is probably one of the most remarkable travel authorizations ever issued, probably also drafted by Groves:

Brigadier General Thomas F. Farrell, U.S.A., is proceeding abroad on a mission for the Secretary of War which is of vital importance to the United States Army. It is essential that General Farrell have the fullest cooperation and assistance from the commanders of all echelons in carrying out his mission.

(Sgd) Thos T. Handy, Acting Chief of Staff. (RG 77, Box 17)

July 27^th

The day after arriving on Tinian, Captain Parsons, commanding officer of Project Alberta, inspected operations on Tinian and sent a status report to General Groves. The projectile assembly for Little Was on Tinian. Three Little Boy tests had been conducted, all successful. The bomb should be ready for use by August 4. The high explosive assemblies for Fat Man were expected by August 3. To meet the current atomic strike schedule, some of the Fat Man tests would have to be abandoned. He wanted Dr. Penny, the British specialist on air burst detonations, to expedite his arrival on Tinian (RG 77, Box 17).

The Great Artist participated in one of the final Little Boy test drops that day. A crew member wrote:

On the 27^th we flew a test mission a few miles off shore. Several high ranking officials were down on the ground to witness the demonstration. On board we had two naval Captains as passengers and two test operators. That flight deck was so congested you had to push the walls back to fart. If we were going to run test hops they could just have well have left us back in the states ( )

Special communications procedures had to be established for reporting on the actual missions. General Norstad in D.C. confirmed with General Spaatz on Guam that formal authorization had been given to General Farrell and Colonel Kirkpatrick to use the USASTAF telecon circuit between Guam and Washington, D. C., for communications to Major General L. R Groves (RG 77, Box 21).

With the fusing and firing systems passing all tests, the team was ready for Activity Five, the final Little Boy test. This was to be a complete dry-run, from loading to drop, including landing and reloading tests at Iwo Jima. L-6 was a complete bomb in all respects, except it contained no active material, live propellant or primers in the firing system. As in previous drops, Harlow Russ installed his new baro-switch vent tubes.

Further clarifying his first message on strike plane crew members, Kirkpatrick confirmed the names of the electronics weapons officers, “weaponeers,” who had been chosen for the atomic bombing mission -- or missions as it might be: Team one Second Lieutenant Morris R. Jeppson; Team two Second Lieutenant Phillip M. Barnes.

Kirkpatrick also requested “(a) One mark three relay box tester (B) The thirty volt rectifier now at site Y (C) Ten each color safety plugs F in all future shipments include two each color safety plugs with each assembly.”

Of great concern to the scientists was that neither Alvarez nor Johnston had received information on aerial cameras type K-17-c for the observation plane. They needed the cameras shipped asap (RG 77, Box 21).

As a result of the Potsdam Declaration and in a sincere attempt to prevent as many civilian deaths as possible, the allies began to warn Japanese cities that they might be bombed. On July 27, eleven Japanese cities were warned that they might be attacked. Imagine what it was like for the Japanese civilians to read the following message:

These leaflets are being dropped to notify you that your city has been listed for destruction by our powerful air force. The bombings will begin within 72 hours.

We give the military clique this notification of our plans because we know there is nothing they can do to stop our overwhelming power and our iron determination. We want you to see how powerless the military is to protect you.

Systematic destruction of city after city will continue as long as you blindly follow your military leaders whose blunders have placed you on the very brink of oblivion. It is your responsibility to overthrow the military government now and save what is left of your beautiful country.

In the meanwhile, we urge all civilians to evacuate at once (LeMay, 1965, p. 375).

The following day, six of the eleven cities were bombed. There was little action on the part of the civilians at first. However, after the first three cities on the list were burned out, the rest were depopulated in nothing flat (LeMay, 1965, p. 375). On July 31, twelve cities were warned and the following day four were destroyed. The last of the warnings were delivered on August 5 (Churchill, 1953, p. 644).

July 28

Now that the target assembly for Little Boy and active sphere for Fat Man were safely on hand, the calendar of test events could be analyzed. Assuming that the full rehearsal of dummy Little Boy on 29 July is successful -- including landing at Iwo Jima, unloading and reloading the bomb, returning to Tinian, dropping the bomb and detonating it at the proper altitude, then “L Day” could possibly be moved up to August 1. Knowing that General Farrell would not come to Tinian before visiting Guam and would not arrive on Guam until July 31, Parsons and Ramsey requested confirmation from Groves that operations could proceed in the absence of General Farrell if his arrival on Tinian was delayed. Admiral Purnell had arrived that day. Parsons and Ramsey emphasized that this made no change F Day, which was still scheduled for August 10 – at best (RG 77, Box 20). Ramsey agreed: “Event A-15 [the active Little Boy drop] may come as early as 1 August 1945 (RG 77, Box 17).”

With that, Parsons gave Kirkpatrick the list of all the project personnel that would be flying on the instrument missions. Luis Alvarez and Harold Agnew would fly in the instrument aircraft. Lawrence Johnston and T/4 Walter Goodman would fly in the observation aircraft.

He also advised Groves that Event A-4, the next Little Boy test, had been completed satisfactorily in all respects. Most important, “Electrical release mechanisms worked satisfactorily in first test of new aircraft (RG 77, Box 19).”

One of the most interesting episodes in the atomic bomb project began on July 28 – the supposed “jinx” on the Fat Man bomb. The 509^th B-29s remaining at Wendover Field were ordered to fly to Kirtland Field and load up the Fat Man spheres for delivery to Tinian. With the plutonium-polonium core and initiator already on Tinian, the spheres were the last parts necessary to complete the bomb.

Captain Edward M. Costello piloted Silverplate No. 44-86347, later named Laggin’ Dragon. Plane No. 44-86346, Luke the Spook, was piloted by Captain Herman S. Zahn, Jr.; and Captain W.F. Hartshorn commanded 265386. They flew without incident from Wendover to Kirkland on July 27. There, they were met by a small convoy from Los Alamos carrying Fat Man Special Stores #F-31, #F-32 and # F-33, the high explosive spheres for the Fat Man bomb. Each weighed about 10,500 pounds -- without the trigger mechanism (Campbell, personal correspondence). Number #F-31, the sphere that would eventually find its way to Nagasaki, was loaded into the front bomb bay of Costello’s plane. #F-32 and #F-33 were loaded into the front bomb bays of Zahn’s and Hartshorn’s planes. To balance the weight of the plane, the back bomb bay was loaded with cargo and baggage. In light of the fact that they were headed to the front and their buddies there didn’t have access to a base exchange, there was undoubtedly a considerable load of unidentified cargo helping balance the plane.

Apparently, there was a considerable ruckus at planeside the following morning when special couriers tried to board the planes. No one had told the pilots that they were going to carry couriers. He was not on the manifest. The pilots complained that their slots were all full and they were already over the 130,000-pound maximum take-off weight, they couldn’t possibly take them. When the couriers flashed their badges and orders from Col. de Silva, there was no choice. There had been a communications slip-up. The couriers got on board, with their baggage. The record does not tell whether any “excess” baggage was taken off. Despite being “over weight,” the pilots all took off without incident and headed for Mather Air Field, California, where they would refuel and process out for Hickam Air Field, Hawai’i.

Commander Bradbury had been on hand throughout the loading and take-off procedures. He reported what he saw to Oppenheimer, who advised Parsons that the planning for the move had been “extremely poor.”

Some of the vehicles [B-29s] were seriously overloaded, since personnel and equipment not part of our project were loaded without reference to the main function of the trip. . . . It was unclear who was in charge of the vehicles as a group. We feel that a much closer liaison will be required if these operations are to be conducted satisfactorily in the future. The technical aspects of the loading went very well (RG 77, Box 20).

Parsons received further notification of a potential problem with the B-29s when he received the following status report from his special liaison officer at Mathers Air Force Base, California, Lieutenant Marsh:

265386 W.F. Hartshorn - 4 Off and 9 Em + Lt. Hull Courier.

486347 - E. M Costello - 5 off, 1 civ. and 12 EM + Lt. Clark, courier.

486346 - Capt.. H.S. Zahn - 4 off + 13 EM + Lt. Richardson, courier.

Due Mathers Field 12:30 EWT

Gossip. They probably will not go beyond S.F. until Sunday night - probably weather. Delay due to engine -- now estimating out @ 0500 PWT Monday 7/30/45

Col. de Silva told no one that he had couriers to go on B-29’s - snafu.

No one was put off @ Albu. because of couriers going along - even tho Heflin recommended it.

Pilots will let no one in airplane - will guard, but not shroud object. Crew will gas plane and handle maintenance. (From, Lt. Marsh at Mather Field, Calif. Sacramento c/o Maj. Carrier, X56 or Maj. Smith, X321, from Jones @ Albu: NM 9:30 am 7/28 RG 77 Box 19)

These “overloaded” Silverplates, captained by Hartshorn, Costello and Zahn, took off from Kirtland about 6:45 am on the 28^th carrying three sets of high explosive assemblies for the implosion type bomb. What developed was a rather serious mini-drama that could have jeopardized the mission. The problems began when they arrived at Mather Field, California. A tremendous flow of men and equipment was streaming through Mathers, heading west to America’s newly established Pacific bases in preparation for the pending invasion of Japan. Mathers had developed a set of stringent maintenance and security programs for all planes departing for Pacific bases. To the men who processed Pacific-bound aircraft daily, one group of three B-29s headed for the Marianas was no different from any of the rest. So, when the three Silverplates landed and were found to be “overloaded” for the flight to Hawaii, they were grounded.

Captain King, Captain Parson’s contact in San Francisco, told Parsons that:

Bean is very peeved about the whole deal. De Silva told no one that he was to place couriers on B-29’s --Heflin and Bean didn’t know. Didn’t know until Monday July 23 that Bolstad, and Brin were to go along. Didn’t find out until 11PM last night that couriers were to go. -- Damn poor admin work. Larkin confirmed couriers on call. (Persuaded Bean not to send his complaint to Fisher on our handling of mess).

Not notified about extra passengers. Didn’t know 3 men were going so were upset and did not want extra passengers at all.

However, the problems with these three B-29s were not yet over. At about 0630 in the morning Capt. Hartshorn made a last minute check on his aircraft and found a leak in the injection pump in his number three motor. Work on the damaged unit revealed that it could not be taken out because of a frozen bolt and therefore it would be necessary to install an entire new carburetor. Capt. Zahn decided to stay back to permit his crew to change the carburetor in Hartshorn’s engine.

So, Captain Costello took off alone at 0810 on 29 July, which was probably not a good idea. His decision became self-correcting shortly after take off when the door to the compartment containing the right front life raft came open and the life raft flew out of the compartment and struck the right stabilizer and elevator. For a few seconds the life raft was wedged on top of the right elevator making it impossible for the plane to gain altitude. Finally it blew off of the elevator but left a large jagged hole in the fabric. With great difficulty, Costello maintained control of the aircraft and made an emergency landing back at Mathers.

Costello wanted to remove the damaged elevator himself, but the officer in charge of the maintenance crew stopped him. By regulation, he had to take a picture of the damage and conduct an investigation prior to any repair work. Thanks to some quick thinking on the part of Manhattan Project liaison officer, the field was convinced not to conduct the investigation and agreed to allow the repair work to start immediately. Repairs to both planes were completed that day and all three were scheduled to leave at 0030 on 30 July.

At 0105, just a half hour after taking off, word was received in the tower that Hartshorn’s plane was returning to Mathers, again. He was reading high fuel pressure in his number four engine. While the others droned on toward Tinian, Hartshorn landed at 0125. The maintenance crew immediately discovered that there was an obstruction in the tube leading to the pressure gauge. Once the obstruction was cleared, Hartshorn took off again at 0242 (RG 77, Box 20, envelope B; RG 77, Box 17).

While this comedy of errors was going on in California, Tibbets sent another flight of Silverplates to Japan, bombing targets LeMay had identified either visually if weather permitted, or by radar if not.

General Farrell also left Mathers that afternoon, flying to Guam with Groves’s public relations man, Major Monahan (RG 77, Box 17). There would be no local media on Tinian at the time of the first drop. Monahan would handle the media on Guam, when the time came.

July 29

Early in the morning Tibbets sent eight Silverplates on Pumpkin runs to the Empire, bombing individually designated targets in Mushashino, Ube, Maisuru, Wakayama, and Koriyama. Meanwhile, Major Sweeney flew Next Objective to Iwo Jima, where a standby crew unloaded Little Boy test bomb L-6 into the pit Kirkpatrick had constructed there, loaded it back into the aircraft and flew it home to Tinian. There it was unloaded and taken back to the assembly shed where it would wait for the full dress rehearsal for L-Day on July 31.

General Spaatz arrived on Guam that same day, July 29, 1945, to take command of the new U.S. Army Air Force Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific and took command of the 20^th Air Force (Mets, 1988, p.295). LeMay suddenly found himself a subordinate officer. He later wrote, “I understood what went on. The war is over in Europe. Here’s this winning team. May as well send ’em out, let’s get it done in the Pacific.” He gave Spaatz a tour of the Pacific Strategic Air Forces, then continued to do what he had been doing, paying due respect to the senior Army Air Force officer in the room next door.

Spaatz then handed LeMay a copy of the directive from the War Department ordering him to order the 509^th to “deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August.” This was the order to that had been approved by President Truman on July 25, the day before he issued the Potsdam Declaration. Colonel Tibbets flew up from Tinian to attend the change of command ceremony, while Sweeney flew the final test mission. Tibbets later wrote at the meeting in LeMay’s office with General Spaatz and others:

I assured them that we were ready and that the bomb had been assembled, minus the two small slugs of uranium that were being kept under guard in the ordnance area (Tibbets, p. 201).

July 30

General Farrell and Major Monyhan arrived on Guam the next day and met with Admiral Nimitz, General LeMay and Colonel Kirkpatrick. After presenting them with his personal orders from Stimson and Marshall, Farrell asked Nimitz to have submarines and navy flying boats stationed along the route the 509^th planes would take to and from the target. Nimitz readily agreed to this. In fact, Nimitz assured General Farrell, the navy was already providing constant patrols for B-29’s flying to and from Japan from all island bases. With that business out of the way, the meeting ended and Admiral Nimitz called Farrell over to a window in his hilltop office and pointed north toward a speck on the horizon and said:

That island over there is Rota. There are about 3,000 Japanese on it. They bother us a great deal. They have radios. They know what we are doing. They are sending out information. Haven’t you got a small bomb you can drop on Rota? I don’t feel it warrants and amphibious invasion at the time. But they do bother us.

Reportedly, Farrell replied, “Unfortunately, Admiral, all our bombs are big ones (Potter, p. 385).”

General Farrell Nimitz’s office and headed to the airport for his first visit to Tinian. There, he would assume command of the atomic bomb operations as General Groves’ personal representative. Of course, Colonel Kirkpatrick was at the runway to meet him. Shortly, he was cloistered with Colonel Tibbets, Admiral Purnell and Captain Parsons. All the top brass of the Army Corps of Engineers, Army Air Force and Navy teams, as well as the Project Alberta team, were on Tinian. They were totally focused on completing their mission and, hopefully, going home to their families – just as would the Japanese, British, Australians, Indians and others still involved in the war. They were confident that if they compled their mission successfully, it would bring peace not only to the United States and Japan, but also China and the rest of Southeast Asia.

Farrell spent considerable time that day with Captain Parsons and Colonel Kirkpatrick, who gave him a status report on the Iwo Jima intermediate base facilities as well as the current activities of the First Technical Detachment. Mostly, Parsons described the situation with regard to the work and tests that still had to be completed before the bomb would be ready for use. In the end, both Parsons and Kirkpatrick stated for the record that they were confident that everything would happen on schedule.

As Kirkpatrick had feared earlier, problems began to develop in the 1^st Ordnance area and the air-conditioned assembly buildings as more and more Project personnel arrived. Everyone wanted to get into the show, causing congestion and work interruptions at the work sites. Parsons had his Project Technical Committee establish order. From then on only those people actually carrying out the immediate operation, the project team leaders in charge of the immediate operation, persons doing other work in the same building -- provided it has been previously agreed that both types of work will be carried out concurrently -- or guards specifically assigned to the operation. He then restricted to two the number of project officers within 50 feet of the assembly buildings (RG 77, Box 17).

The team also analysed the procedure they would follow on L-Day. They would load Little Boy onto its trailer at 2:00 in the afternoon, the day before the mission. They would then leave the assembly building as soon as the mission is confirmed and begin loading the bomb at 3:00 p.m. According to Dr. Ramsey, Parsons agreed that they should tell the Island Commander, General Kimble, about the possible dangers to the island on take-off. At least they would alert fire fighting equipment and Air Sea Rescue.

While the Project Alberta team and the 509^th prepared for the Little Boy drop, General LeMay maintained “unrelenting pressure” on the Japanese to surrender, as per orders he had received from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. The air war from Tinian continued to grow in intensity as the number of air craft with trained crews increased to nearly 400. They joined the armada LeMay was launching from the Guam and Saipan against Japan at least twice a week. By the end of July, the 20^th Air Force had reduced (which is military-eeze for destroyed, burnt to the ground) 60 medium to large Japanese cities housing munitions factories and military compounds (Coffey, p. 176).

July 31

Luis Alvarez finally received notification that Oppenheimer was sending Waldman to Tinian with a new Fastax camera to take early stage pictures of the atomic explosion (RG 77, Box 18).

The primary project for the last day of the month was a complete dress rehearsal for the Little Boy drop, this time with Tibbets at the controls. L-6, having already visited Iwo Jima on the 29^th, was now loaded into the as yet unnamed Enola Gay , 44-86292, and flown back to Iwo Jima, this time accompanied by Sweeney in The Great Artiste and Marquardt in Necessary Evil (Campbell). After completing the rendezvous at Iwo Jima, the trio of Silverplates flew back to Tinian and dropped the last Little Boy test bomb within sight of the island (Campbell, p. 46).

This is how Spitzer described it from The Great Artiste:

We were to drop 2 miles off shore. For company this time we had Commander Ashworth. On the ground to witness the demonstration was a 3 star general, a 1 star general, a couple of Admirals and some smaller fry. This had to be good! One dry run and then a live run. The bomb hung up on the live run, necessitating depressurization so that Beahan could crawl into the tunnel to adjust the release.

Something going snafu every time. We fussed around for about an hour but finally accomplished what we had set out to do. Reports from the ground were, “everything worked fine, results satisfactory.

It is not known where Spitzer obtained the scuttlebutt about a three-star general. Perhaps General Kimble or General Davies, or both had been present. However Admiral Purnell, Col. Kirkpatrick and Robert Warner were definitely at one of the assembly buildings with binoculars. They were frustrated with the first failure. Then they held their collective breaths as the little black egg fell from Enola Gay and race earthward on the second pass. They saw the puff of smoke that indicated the complicated electrical circuit had completed the loading sequence at the correct altitude and breathed deeply. They saw the bomb hit the water, then listened to the continuing roar of the falling bomb for several seconds after it hit the water. The Little Boy Team declared the test a complete success in all respects, except for the hang up with the release system. Tibbets would have ordered someone to fix the “darn” bomb release mechanism. The next Little Boy drop would be “no drill.”

Parsons reported to Groves that the dress rehearsal went well. It was the fourth successful drop of a fused Little Boy dummy. The practice reloading at Iwo Jima had been accomplished two days earlier. Project A was technically operational for Little Boy. L-11 was being prepared. Everything and everybody was ready for L-Day, Farrell told Groves (RG 77, Box 19). There was nothing left undone on Tinian which might delay initiation of the Little Boy operation. They were only waiting on the weather over Japan (RG 77, Box 17). “F-Day” was still scheduled for August 10. Weather over Japan was now looking good for “L-Day” on August 3 (RG 77, Box 21).

Dr. Ramsey agreed. He reported that the active Little Boy -- L-11 -- was completely assembled except for the installation of the Archie batteries and antennae, loading the gun, inserting the mushroom, loading it into the B-29, and final check. Those operations only awaiting a favorable weather forecast (N.F. Ramsey.).

August 1, 1945

In celebration of Air Force Day, 1945, General LeMay sent over 800 B-29s to Japan from the Marianas. General Spaatz flew to Manila that day to show General MacArthur a copy of his orders to drop the atomic bombs. MacArthur said the dropping of the atomic bombs would change warfare—without explaining what he meant.

In support of Project Alberta, Major Sweeney flew the first Fat Man test drop that morning, expending unit F-13 from Bockscar. It was the first of three test drops he would fly in that ship. Unit F-13 had inert mockup high explosive blocks made of plaster, eight live detonators, a full set of fusing components, a Raytheon X-unit, inert nose fuses, radio informers, and smoke puffs. The observers on the shore watched F-13 fall and “puff” at exactly the right altitude, indicating that the barometric trigger system had worked correctly

Ramsey advised Groves that he thought that at least three Fat Man test drops were necessary; two inert FM’s, complete with X-unit and normal fusing, and one final rehearsal HE-filled fat man of the trap-door model. The first Fat Man test had already been run successfully. Members of the High Explosive team, the Pit Team, the Firing System Team and the Fusing Team were at work assembling the second Fat Man test unit -- F-18. Ramsey was still concerned that delays or failures in the on-going Fat Man test program at Kirtland might be their limiting factor. Nevertheless said Groves’ chief physicist on Tinian, the first active Fat Man drop was still scheduled for August 10 (N.F. Ramsey).” Nothing more could be done until the rest of the parts arrived. Where were those three B-29s with the high explosive spheres? They had left Kirtland on the 28^th carrying the Fat Man spheres. The delay was making the men of Project Alberta anxious. The orders from the president had been quite clear; the second bomb was to be dropped as soon as possible after the first. Truman hoped that the Japanese would quit after just one bomb. However, if they did not, he wanted another one dropped immediately; a one-two punch. He wanted the Japanese leaders to think America had plenty of them.

The Fat Man team was still working the bugs out of the Raytheon detonating “X unit” fusing system. It had arrived late from the factory. By the time the parts arrived on Tinian, several changes had been made that were new to the men on Tinian. However, it appears that having the best of the best minds at both ends of the rope proved successful. The directions that arrived with the newly fabricated parts were adequate for the assembly team to understand. They continued to piece the bomb together. It did take extra time, though, because the changes made in the size or shape of a single part also required the development of a new technique or tool to install it.

The entire Special Technical Unit was hard at work putting the finishing touches on the world’s first atom bombs. However, both Farrell and Parsons were concerned about the limited amount of time available to test new Fat Man parts. Communications from Los Alamos and Kirtland regarding on-going tests had been poor. They would do the test themselves at Tinian, if they had to, but had no time to waste duplicating Fat Man tests that might have already been conducted in the States. Parsons cabled Commander Bradbury, “We have received no information by telecon on results of K tests.” He wanted to be updated daily on all tests performed in the states (RG 77, Box 19).

One of the most significant, last-minute changes in the Fat Man bomb design was the addition of a small diameter tube called “the hypodermic.” This was installed to monitor the neutron background of the pit -- not the loading pit, but the fissionable plutonium ball that fits into the center of the bomb -- during the subsequent assembly operations.

The nose fuses that had just been developed at Inyokern which had never been used before were received and installed. Harlow Russ describes these activities at the assembly building on Tinian:

The nose fuses, from Project Camel, were accompanied by drawings and installation instructions that proved to be adequate. However, since this was the first set to be installed, we required considerable time to determine a technique for inserting them into the front ellipsoid and stringing the cables around the high explosive case into the rear ellipsoid and to the locations of the four special detonators. This was done by the HE-ME Team. The detonators were then installed and connected by the Firing Team.

With a real bomb, with live pit and live HE, the installation of the nose fuses was a sensitive operation, since they were actuated by impact and could not be safed by electrical means. Thus, we are careful to develop a proper technique with the inert practice units (Russ, p. ).

And a unique new method of sealing the conical cover of the bomb arrived with instruction on how to mix and apply it. It was one of the world’s first epoxies. It also had never been used or tested before arrival at Tinian.

The ever inventive Dr. Luis Alvarez was busy creating the equipment to measure the magnitude and shape of the shock wave.

A terrible message was received on Tinian that day. The USS Indianapolis had been sunk after leaving Guam for the Philippines. The news shocked the men of the 509^th who had helped the sailors unload the fissionable material from the great old heavy cruiser. After setting a new time record for the cruise from Port Chicago in San Francisco Bay to Tinian and dropping off the uranium components for the bomb, Captain Charles Butler McVay had taken his ship to Guam for reassignment. There, he was given orders for the Philippines. At about midnight on the 30^th, not far off Guam, the Indianapolis was caught silhouetted in the moonlight by Lt. Commander Mochitsura Hashimoto, commander of the submarine I.58. He put a spread of torpedoes into the side of the ship, which exploded and sank within minutes. It was discovered later that the Philippine headquarters had never been informed by Nimitz’ headquarters that the Indianapolis as leaving Guam and expected in Philippine waters, shortly. The disaster was only discovered after a search was ordered and a navy search craft found the survivors floating among the flotsam of the Indianapolis. Only 316 men of her crew of 1,196 survived the sinking, and the sharks that preyed on them for several days while they drifted in the Pacific praying for rescue. The USS Indianapolis was the last American capitol ship lost in World War II.

Charley O’Brien, Major Furman and Jim Nolan had spent two weeks on board the ship as the Little Boy couriers and had become close to many members of the crew. Certainly, as work continued on the Little Boy mission, many minds dwelt on the fate of the men of the Indianapolis.

Finally on August 1, Kirkpatrick was informed that the high explosive charges that had been delayed at Mather Field were on their way again: “Report B-29s 346, 347, 386 all arrived at point midway between Hawaii and Tinian. ETD all three headed for Tinian is now 0800Z. ETA at Tinian is 1400Z.”

August 2, 1945

To be sure, when the planes began landing the next morning, Tibbets was standing by to speak to his “overloaded” pilots. And, no doubt, Parsons was Johnny on the spot when the “overloaded” planes arrived on Tinian with their priceless cargo. It will be remembered that Oppenheimer had chastised the loading crew for their manhandling of these precisely shaped high-explosive charges. When F-31, 32 and 33 were opened and examined in the 1^st Ordnance Area, Parsons discovered that one of the blocks was badly cracked and could not be used. The best of the three was picked for F-31, the Fat Man that would be dropped in combat. The other one would be used for a full run Fat Man test drop. The third was useless. Another would have to be sent for the planned third active bomb.

Oppenheimer was still trying to get a camera that would photograph the precise second of the Fat Man explosion loaded into the tail of the observation aircraft. He advised Parsons that the Fastax was coming with Waldman. He warned that it might not be successful, but asked that they at least give it a try. They were still working on the timing mechanism and the correct light setting relative to the sun at the time the bomb exploded (RG 77, Box 17).

Kirkpatrick advised Groves that day that the weathermen were now predicting the first clear weather over Hiroshima would not be until August 4. He said Groves would made a decision at midnight. (RG 77, Box 21).

August 3, 1945

The orders received by LeMay specified that the bombs would be dropped on or after August 3, depending on weather. Because the skies over southern Japan were still expected to be cloud covered, the launch was delayed even though Little Boy was ready to go. While waiting for the weather to clear, the Fat Man team began assembling F-33. This unit was to be used for another complete dry-run text, just as they had done with L-6 unit. Although there would be no fissionable material in the bomb and therefore no possibility of an accidental atomic explosion, loading the high explosive charges, live detonators and live nose fuses, complete fusing and firing systems and the radio informer equipment, was dangerous and made for a realistic dress rehearsal.

Farrell, Parsons and Ramsey updated Groves again on August 3. They said Little Boy was still only waiting on clear weather. Test unit F-13 had been tested and produced puffs as expected. Unit F-18 was fully prepared and placed in its B-29. “However,” they wrote, “our complete lack of information on results of tests [done in New Mexico] on internal pressure of sealed units made us decide to reopen unit F-18 and to connect Doll’s baro unit so that we could obtain the information here.” They now felt comfortable with the F-18 test on 5 August. They were beginning assembly of unit F-33 for a test drop on August 7. “Our earliest readiness for important Fat Man is 10 August” (RG 77, Box 17).

There was a degree of hesitancy among the teams assembling the Fat Man bomb because late deliveries of the factory-made Raytheon X-Units to Los Alamos had prevented their team from testing it for use with a full set of live high explosives. Word was finally received from Kingman (Wendover) that an identical unit had been tested successfully on August 4^th. With that, the team more vigorously continued with the assembly operation. However, all personnel not actually working on the bomb was asked to remain in the Headquarters in the First Ordinance Tech Area, or in camp, but not in the area where the bomb was being assembled. “This was done to prevent the possibility of wiping out the entire assembly team in one accident.” (Russ, p. 58.)

As the anticipated Little Boy drop approached, a degree of anxiety arose among some members of the Alberta team who knew what was really going on. They were concerned about the ability of the “chosen plane” to get off the ground safely with its untested nuclear load. It was still not unusual for a B-29 engine to catch fire on take off and blow up on the runway. No one knew what might happen if by some circumstance, the launch plane crashed and burned on take off.

According to the plan he had written and as approved by Groves, Parson’s himself would load the Little Boy “gun” with high explosive packages that would propel the atomic bullet at its atomic target at sufficient speed to create the critical mass necessary to create an atomic explosion. This was to be done, of course, on the ground, under controlled conditions, with a procedure that had been performed several times already, just before the bomb was loaded into the aircraft.

Almost daily since arriving back on island, Parsons read reports of Superfortresses that had crashed and burned on take-off or splashed into the ocean just off the edge of the reef. Wreckage of planes that didn’t make it were piled between runways. The uranium gun-type bomb had never been tested. Undoubtedly, if the plane crashed on take off, the conventional high explosive charges would explode and destroy the aircraft. But would the bomb go atomic? No one really knew. If it did, it would destroy most of North Field and certainly the entire atom bomb project. Tibbets remained confident of another successful take off. Nevertheless, Navy Captain William S. “Deke” Parsons became seriously concerned. Responsibility for the bomb had been made clear in a message sent to General LeMay by General Norstad on May 29, 1945, just in case an emergency arose. “The senior officer specialist will be qualified by familiarity with the design, development and tactical features of the bomb, to render final judgment in the event that an emergency requires deviation from the tactical plan (Groves, p.317).

Parsons talked over the situation with General Farrell, General Groves’ man on the spot. He agreed that Parsons would arm the bomb after the plane was safely airborne. Under his direction, Parsons had a small folding platform installed at the rear of the bomb bay in B-29 No. 82, shortly to be named Enola Gay. On this platform, Parsons and Lt. Morris Jeppson, his weaponeer and electronics officer from the First Ordnance Squadron, began practicing loading the high explosive charge into Little Boy inside the bomb bay.

That same day, August 3, Parsons wrote a formal report, almost a complaint, to General Groves, expressing his frustration with Los Alamos communications. He was on Tinian, trying to put together an atomic bomb without adequate instructions. Parts were still missing and he was receiving no information from Los Alamos as to what is going on. Basically, he was more than mildly irritated and wants Groves to straighten things out:

Vital tests connection FM development particularly x-ray unit tests have presumably been underway during the past week at Morose (Los Alamos) and W-47 (Wendover).

When he had left Los Alamos, the first vital tests on the new detonation system had been scheduled for July 30. Others were also scheduled. Yet, Tinian had received practically no reports in regard to any of them. If they were postponed for good reason, then he and the Tinian team needed to know why. The number of tests Parsons was going to run on Tinian had been limited because they expected results from the Los Alamos and Wendover tests. The Tinian tests were only supposed to be conducted to confirm the Los Alamos and Wendover tests.

Lack of information on day to day progress on the above program unnecessarily clouds the technical picture here. A glaring example is lack of information on pressure recorded . . .

Parsons requested Groves to talk to Oppenheimer about the communications problem and ensure that a daily summary was prepared and transmitted to Tinian “even if the people concerned have to work all night.” (RG77 Box 19)

Apparently, a message quickly arrived from Los Alamos. Farrell and Parsons advised groves that the “Outline and summary given in your nr 60 of 3 August is just what is needed here. For our part we will endeavor to match Morose (Santa Fe) with daily Papacy (Tinian) summaries. If they didn’t continue to received then reports:

The effect could be that a lethal drop may be made here before information is received that the first similar drops have been successfully made at Misplay (Kingman). RG77 box 19)

Getting the manifest for the atomic strike mission fully approved remained a lingering problem. The problem now was that both Parsons and Ashworth would need a technical assistant on board the strike aircraft to help monitor the electrical circuits. These names had not been included in the original manifest. Parsons reminded General Groves that the “helpers” for the combat teams were AAF Officers attached to Tibbets group. They were essential to the operation in that “they will operate the special electric equipment in the aircraft that checks operation of Erodes and Fussels’ equipment.” Because they were not at that time on flight status, Tibbets had submitted a request for them to be designated as an aircraft observer on July 30 July. Parsons and Farrell requested that steps be taken to obtain prompt and favorable action on the above in order that these Flyers may be on flight status for crucial operation (RG 77, Box 19).

The Tinian Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained their strong feelings about the list of targets for the one two punch. “Conclusion reached from discussion here is that Kyoto question should be reopened immediately after first mission (RG77, Box 21).

That afternoon, Tibbets and Parsons called the crew members together for their first briefing on the gimmick. They had been told that the time had come to drop the real bomb, although they were not told exactly what kind of bomb it was. Sgt. Abe Spitzer had known that they would be doing something special since he was transferred to the 393^rd Squadron on January 7. Chuck Sweeney suggested he join the squadron because they were going to do something that would shorten the war by six months, probably repeating the same recruiting speech Tibbets had given him. Before leaving the meeting they were told not to talk to anybody about what they had been told, not even among themselves. It was the best kept secret in the war and the leadership wanted to keep it that way. Spitzer and the other chosen crews were told that after the bomb was dropped, there would be a news release from Washington, D.C., that would explain what the gimmick was all about. Spitzer asked, “Even the Bronx Home News?”

“Sure,” responded the public relations man, Major Mohynahan. “Even the Bronx’ll know about this one.”

After the briefing, Spitzer and a couple men for the crew wandered over the air field to check on their aircraft, but no deal. An armed MP stood guard over the plane. Perhaps plush seats were being installed, snickered one of them. They walked back to their hut and sat on their bunks the rest of the afternoon, sipping on a bottle of liquor. They voted on a name for their aircraft: The Great Artiste, after their bombardier, Captain Kermit K. Beahan’s, who had an uncanny proclivity with women. They played poker, trying not to think about the upcoming mission.

 The same day, President Truman left Potsdam. He and his remaining entourage flew to Amsterdam, where the Augusta waited to take them home.